## Cantor's Set Theory from a Modern Point of View

Georg Ferdinand Ludwig Philipp Cantor

Berlin doctorate 1867 (number theory) Appointed in Halle 1869, habilitation (number theory)

Heine  $\rightarrow$  Study of trigonometric series  $\rightarrow$  Set theory:

Theory of transfinite numbers and cardinality Algebraic numbers are countable

Real numbers are not countable

1-1 correspondence between n-dimensional space and the real line

Founder of the DMV 1890 First President of the DMV 1891

Opposition: Kronecker Support: Dedekind ???: Mittag-Leffler Transfinite counting C closed set of reals C' = limit points of C (Cantor derivative)  $C \supseteq C' \supseteq C'' \supseteq \cdots$   $C^{\infty} = \text{the intersection}$   $C^{\infty} \supseteq (C^{\infty})'$ , maybe strict! Keep counting:  $C^{\infty} \supseteq C^{\infty+1} \supseteq C^{\infty+2} \supseteq \cdots$ !

What is  $0, 1, ..., \infty, \infty + 1, ...$ ? Wellordering: Linear ordering with no infinite descending sequence

Cantor: Any 2 wellorderings are comparable Each wellordering isomorphic to an *ordinal*, a special wellordering ordered by  $\in$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} 0 \,=\, \emptyset, 1 \,=\, \{0\}, 2 \,=\, \{0,1\}, ..., \omega \,=\, \{0,1,2,...\}, \\ \omega + 1 \,=\, \omega \cup \{\omega\}, \ldots \end{array}$ 

Cantor's assumption: Every set can be wellordered

Therefore every set bijective with an ordinal (not unique)

*Cardinal* = Ordinal not bijective with a smaller ordinal

Every set bijective with a *unique* cardinal, its *cardinality* 

Zermelo: Cantor's assumption follows from the Axiom of Choice So Cantor's theory of cardinality applies to arbitrary sets

One major gap!

What is the cardinality of the continuum?

Continuum Hypothesis (CH): Every uncountable set of reals has the same cardinality as the set of all reals

## Paradoxes

Cantor, Burali-Forti, Russell  $x = all \ y$  such that  $y \notin y$  $x \in x \leftrightarrow x \notin x!$ 

Zermelo's proposal Only use established principles of set-formation Axiomatic theory: Zermelo set theory ZFC = Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice

The Universe of Sets V

ZFC gives the following picture:

First picture of VReduces V to ordinals and power set operation *Not* a canonical description

The Vagueness of Power Set

2 approaches:

Definable sets: descriptive set-theory Borel sets = smallest  $\sigma$ -algebra containing all open sets

 $\Sigma_1^1 = \text{continuous image of a Borel set}$   $\Pi_1^1 \text{ set} = \text{complement of } \Sigma_1^1 \text{ set}$   $\Sigma_{n+1}^1 \text{ set} = \text{continuous image of } \Pi_n^1 \text{ set}$   $\Pi_{n+1}^1 \text{ set} = \text{complement of } \Sigma_{n+1}^1 \text{ set}$  $Projective = \Sigma_n^1 \text{ or } \Pi_n^1 \text{ for some } n$  1930s  $\Sigma^1_1$  sets satisfy CH: an uncountable  $\Sigma^1_1$  set has the cardinality of the reals  $\Pi^1_1$  sets?

Constructibility (Gödel) Replace power set operation by a weak power set operation:  $V_{\alpha+1} =$  all subsets of  $V_{\alpha}$  $L_{\alpha+1} =$  all "simple" subsets of  $L_{\alpha}$ L = union of the  $L_{\alpha}$ 's L satisfies ZFC First canonical model (= interpretation) of ZFC CH holds in L!

Gödel:

L is *not* the correct intepretation of ZFC Only a tool for showing that statements are consistent with ZFC

There are other interpretations of ZFC: Cohen's Forcing method Add new sets to L, preserving ZFC R is Cohen over L iff R belongs to every open dense set of reals which L can "describe" Add many Cohen reals to L, obtain model where CH fails

Another use of forcing: R in [0,1] is random over L iff R belongs to every measure one subset of [0,1]which L can "describe" Using random reals: Model where every projective set of reals is Lebesgue measurable

Thus CH is undecidable using the ZFC axioms

Dilemma: Different universes with different kinds of mathematics?

## Canonical Universes

Find canonical, acceptable interpretation of VCorrect answers to undecidable problems given by this interpretation

Gödel's L is canonical, but not acceptable: Too easily changed using forcing

Universes constructed using forcing are not canonical:

If there is one Cohen (random) real over L, then there are many

How does one obtain canonical universes larger than L?

Answer from measure theory Countably additive extension of Lebesgue measure to all sets of reals  $\rightarrow V$  is not L

Model of ZFC with such a measure  $\leftrightarrow$ Model of ZFC with a *measurable cardinal* 

Silver:

Measurable cardinal  $\rightarrow$  Canonical inner model (= subuniverse) with a measurable cardinal

First canonical interpretation larger than L Acceptable?

Measurable cardinal: example of a "large cardinal hypothesis"

These hypotheses have a crucial role in set theory:

 $\varphi$  is consistency-equivalent to  $\psi$ :

ZFC  $+\varphi$  has a model iff ZFC  $+\psi$  has a model Empirical fact:

For any natural set-theoretic assertion  $\varphi$ ,  $\varphi$  is consistency-equivalent to 0 = 0, 0 = 1 or a large cardinal hypothesis

Large cardinal hypotheses measure the strength of set-theoretic assertions

Silver's model = desired canonical interpretation of V?

Too small!

More than a measurable cardinal is needed to measure strength:

A is Wadge reducible to B iff For some continuous  $f, x \in A$  iff  $f(x) \in B$ 

 $WP_n$ : If A, B are  $\Sigma_n^1$  but not  $\Pi_n^1$  then A is Wadge reducible to B and vice-versa We have:

 $WP_1$  is consistency equivalent to #'s, a large cardinal hypothesis below a measurable cardinal.

 $WP_2$  is consistency equivalent to the existence of a Woodin cardinal, much larger than a measurable cardinal!

 $WP_n$  requires n-1 Woodin cardinals

Desired canonical model for ZFC should allow Woodin cardinals

Ongoing project: Construction of canonical inner models for large cardinals

Cannot be built in ZFC!

Instead: If there is a certain large cardinal then there is a canonical inner model with this large cardinal

Circular? Why should these large cardinals exist? Maybe  $WP_n$  is simply false for n > 1!

Important challenge: Justification of large cardinal hypotheses

One approach: self-embeddings of models M is *rigid* iff there is no embedding  $M \rightarrow M$  preserving basic operations (union, product, difference, ...)

Smallest large cardinal axiom ( $0^{\#}$  exists) equivalent to: *L* is not rigid

L not rigid  $\rightarrow$  there is a canonical  $L^{\#}$  which satisfies "L is not rigid"

Repeat this:  $L^{\#}$  not rigid  $\rightarrow$  there is a canonical  $L^{\#\#}$  where re this is true  $L^{\#\#}$  not rigid  $\rightarrow L^{\#\#\#}$ , etc. Fact: There is a canonical such #-iteration which leads to Woodin cardinals

Analogous to Gödel's construction of *L* (iteration of a weak power set operation) ZFC justifies use of Gödel's operation Here one must argue that models in a canonical *#*-iteration are not rigid Justifies existence of inner models with Woodin cardinals

However: No canonical # iteration is known past Woodin cardinals Finding such an operation remains an important problem and would give:

- 1. A satisfying picture of the set-theoretic universe
- Numerous further applications of set theory
  Justify the use of large cardinal hypotheses
  Substantiate the claim that the paradoxes
  that worried Cantor in the infancy of set theory
  have been definitively resolved.